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Introduction
• Do tax changes affect economic activity? Do 
these economic changes then result in 
changes in state tax revenues? 
• These are some of the questions that dynamic 
revenue analysis or “dynamic scoring” 
attempts to answer. 
Overview
• Theory
• Tax policy and economic growth: empirical 
evidence from the states
• Use of dynamic modeling by the states
• Overview
• Case Study Results
• Conclusion
Supply-Side Links to Dynamic 
Revenue Analysis
• Perhaps no economist is as associated with 
supply-side economics and the “dynamic 
effects” of tax changes as Arthur Laffer...
F
Source: Berck, Golan, and Smith (1996). “Dynamic Revenue Analysis in California: An 
Overview.” State Tax Notes 11:1227-37.
Empirical Evidence:
Effect of Taxes on State Economies
• Taxes generally create a drag on state economies.
• Key reviews of the early literature found: 
– Taxes had a statistically significant negative impact on state 
economic output—
– The size of the effect was potentially subject to 
measurement error and most likely small. 
• Recent studies find a negative effect of tax changes on 
economic variables, but typically the effect is small.
• Some evidence that government spending on 
productive services can offset the negative effects of 
taxes.
Experience of the States
How States Currently Score Tax 
Legislation
Source: Dynamic Impacts of Tax Law Changes (Greg Harkenrider, Office of State Budget 
Director, Commonwealth of Kentucky, September 22, 2004, Presentation to Federation 
of Tax Administrators)
States Experimenting with Dynamic Scoring 
of Tax Policies
REMI v. CGE v. Unknown/Not Used
Dynamic Scoring
• Do tax cuts pay for themselves?  No.
• Does the increased economic activity from tax 
cuts help offset some of the revenue loss?  Yes 
– possibly.
• Assuming there is an effect, what is the 
estimated magnitude of effect? 
California
California DRAM Model of Dynamic Effects of a $1 Billion Increase in Each Tax Type 
(2000 Model Estimates)
Change in 
Individual 
Income Tax
Change in Sales 
and Use Tax
Change in Bank 
and Corporation 
Tax 
Size of Static Increase  
($millions)
$1,000 $1,000 $1,000 
Revenue Feedback ($millions) ($40) ($120) ($180)
% of Static Estimate -4% -12% -18%
Employment Change (persons) -18,000 -10,000 -11,000
Business Investment Change 
($millions)
($83) ($109) ($479)
Note: The changes assume a balanced budget and therefore have expenditure side effects, which are modeled.
Vasche, Jon (2006). “Whatever Happened to Dynamic Revenue Analysis in California?” Proceedings at the Annual Revenue Estimation & Tax 
Research Conference, Federation of Tax Administrators, Portland, OR., September 17-20.
Oregon
Table 2: Oregon OTIM Model of Dynamic Effects of a $100 Million Decrease in Each 
Tax Type
Change in 
Individual 
Income Tax
Corporate 
Income Tax
Business 
Property Tax  
Size of Static Decrease  ($millions) ($100) ($100) ($100)
Revenue Feedback ($millions)(i) $9.65 $15.84 $10.98 
State Revenue Portion ($millions) $6.70 $13.60 $8.10 
Local Revenue Portion ($millions) $2.80 $2.20 $3.24 
% of Static Estimate 9.65% 15.84% 10.98%
Employment (% change) 0.22% 0.06% 0.08%
Wages (% change) -0.14% 0.07% 0.03%
Personal Income (% change) 0.12% 0.20% 0.17%
Return to Capital (% change) 0.01% 0.03% 0.01%
Investment (% change) 0.14% 0.53% 0.20%
Note: The changes assume a balanced budget and therefore have expenditure side effects, which are modeled.
(i) Some state and local revenue totals numbers do not sum to the total perhaps because of rounding issues. Oregon reported state and local 
revenues combined as their dynamic effect, but most other states would only report the state revenue portion. 
Source: The changes assume a balanced budget and therefore have expenditure side effects, which are modeled. Oregon Legislative Revenue 
Office, and Oregon State University (2001). “The Oregon Tax Incidence Model.” Report 1-01 (March). Salem, OR: Legislative Revenue Office.
Nebraska
Table 3: Nebraska Train Model of Dynamic Effects of a $100 Million Decrease in Each 
Tax Type
Change in 
Individual Income 
Tax
Sales and Use Tax 
Size of Static Decrease  ($millions) ($100) ($100)
Revenue Feedback ($millions) $6.40 $20.60 
% of Static Estimate 6.40% 20.60%
Employment Change Total (persons) 1,788 2,615
Employment Change Private Sector (persons) 1,594 2,538
Personal Disposable Income ($millions) $121.60 $181.20 
Investment ($millions) $64.80 $123.34 
Note: The changes assume a balanced budget and therefore have expenditure side effects, which are modeled. 
Source: Nebraska Department of Revenue Research Services (2013). “2010 Nebraska Tax Burden Study.” Lincoln, NE.
New Mexico
Table 5: New Mexico REMI Model of Tax Reform
FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY2008
Static Analysis ($millions) ($21.80) ($83) ($167.20) ($275.20) ($360.30)
Dynamic Analysis ($millions) ($21) ($80.80) ($163) ($268.70) ($352.20)
Difference $0.80 $2.20 $4.20 $6.50 $8.10 
% Dynamic Effect 3.70% 2.70% 2.50% 2.40% 2.20%
Employment (thousands) -0.031 -0.086 -0.156 -0.225 -0.242
Employment: Private Nonfarm 0.311 0.846 1.601 2.417 2.95
Employment: Government -0.342 -0.932 -1.759 -2.641 -3.191
Personal Income ($millions) ($1.50) ($5.00) ($9.00) ($11.50) ($9.50)
Disposable Personal Income ($millions) $30.00 $84.00 $165.50 $260.00 $332.00 
Output ($millions) 0.597 1.824 4.326 10.064 16.627
Source: New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee Staff (2004). “2004 Post-Session Fiscal Review.” Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Legislative 
Finance Committee.
Reduced top personal income tax rate from 8.2% to 4.9% over 5 years
50% cut in capital gains tax
Kansas
Table 6: Kansas Legislative Research Department (KLRD) Estimates of Impact of 2012 HB2117 and STAMP 
Dynamic Revenue Estimates
FY 2013FY 2014FY 2015FY 2016FY 2017FY 2018
Cumulative 
FY 2013-FY 
2018
KLRD Final Revenue (pre-tax changes, millions)(i) $6,394 $6,231 $6,466 $6,708 $6,980 $7,259 $40,038 
KLRD Final Revenue (post-tax changes, millions) $6,163 $5,428 $5,642 $5,854 $6,087 $6,325 $35,499 
KLRD Estimate of HB 2117 (2012 Tax Impact) ($231) ($803) ($824) ($854) ($893) ($934) ($4,539)
% Decline from Original General Funds Budget -4% -13% -13% -13% -13% -13% -11%
STAMP Dynamic Revenue (Pass-Through) $18 $87 $93 $101 $111 $123 $533 
STAMP Dynamic Revenue (Standard) $27 $108 $110 $115 $122 $130 $612 
% Dynamic Effect (Standard) 11.72% 13.47% 13.37% 13.43% 13.70% 13.87% 13.48%
% Dynamic Effect of Post-Tax General Funds Budget 0.44% 1.99% 1.95% 1.96% 2.01% 2.05% 1.72%
Sources: Davidson, Todd, David Tuerck, Paul Bachman, and Michael Head (2012). “Tax Reform Gears Kansas for Growth: A Dynamic Analysis of Additional Revenue and 
Jobs Generated by Tax Reform.” Wichita, KS: Kansas Policy Institute.
Kansas Legislative Research Department (2012). “Supplemental Note on Senate Substitute for House Bill 2117.” Edited by Kansas Legislature. Retrieved from 
www.kslegislature.org.
(i) These are calculated by authors and are derived by restoring the projected HB2117 static tax revenue declines to the post HB2117 baseline. 
Select State $100 million Tax Cuts and Various 
Assumptions on Government Spending 
Gov spend offset
No Gov spend 
offset
GA cut $100 
million
Georgia Sales tax Inc. tax Sales tax Inc. tax
Gov spend 
only
Total Employment -1,161 -1,622 1,410 1,874 -3,042
Priv. Non-Farm Emp. 409 -14 1,288 1,712 -1,310
Gov employment -1,570 -1,608 122 162 -1,732
GSP -$107 -$160 $168 $219 -$328
Real Disp. PI $98 $54 $179 $221 -$125
Nebraska
Total Employment 2,615 1,788
Priv. Non-Farm Emp. 2,538 1,594
Gov employment 77 194
Real Disp. PI $181 $122 
in millions $
The Problem with Measuring Dynamic 
Effects
• Size of the effects are small 
• The largest effects fall within 3.5% average 
error rate for state level revenue estimates 
• Tax cuts do not pay for themselves
• Non-revenue neutral tax cuts lead to 
expenditure reductions, which have negative 
dynamic effects
Conclusion: Pros and Cons of Dynamic 
Revenue Models
• Dynamic modeling has some interesting applications:
– Impacts of policy on jobs and wages
– The ability to measure different economic responses to different 
types of tax changes
– The ability to take a more refined look at the incidence of tax 
policy changes
• Where dynamic modeling falls short:
– Problematic for budgetary decision-making or forecasting 
– Impact of effects takes time
– Effects small compared to state revenues
– Hard to pinpoint dynamic effects for policy makers and citizens
Conclusion: Important Questions for 
Policy Makers
• First, what do policymakers want to learn from dynamic 
revenue estimation? 
– Inform a policy debate
– May not be appropriate for the budgetary process
• Second, states need to consider the resources required 
to develop, customize and then interpret the results 
from a dynamic model. 
– Models are costly and require annual updating
– Models are complicated
– Not a few states have abandoned their efforts at dynamic 
revenue estimation due to this cost and complexity
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